provides summaries of decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, including "unpublished" decisions. 
Copies of decisions, briefs, and other documents in the public record are available through Judicial Update.
August 1 - 31, 2001                                                                                                        Vol.XVIII, No. 8
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PUBLISHABLE OPINIONS

1) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 99-36112 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).  A jury's finding that a defendant had not acted with actual fraud and/or actual malice did not preclude an award of exemplary damages under Montana's Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  B. Fletcher (author), Brunetti, and Fisher, Circuit Judges.  A. Lerner of Kalispell, MT, for the plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants;  D. Smith of Kentfield, CA, and W. Ireland of Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

2)  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY / LATCHES:  Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 00-55781 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  Claims for copyright infringement which were not filed until between 19 and 36 years after the claimant became aware that the defendant's films infringed its copyright was barred by the doctrine of laches as the delay caused the defendant evidentiary and economic prejudice.  McKeown (author) and Fisher, Circuit Judges, and Hagen, District Judge.  K. McClory in propria persona;  P. Cohen of Beverly Hills, CA, for the defendant-appellant;  M. Becker of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

3)  TAXATION / REAL PROPERTY: Gladden v. CIR, 00-70081 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2001).  When a purchaser pays a premium for land based on a realistic expectation that water rights would eventually attach to that land, the purchaser may, upon sale of the later-acquired water rights, claim a cost basis equal to the premium paid.  Beezer, O'Scannlain, and W. Fletcher (author), Circuit Judges.  B. Raby of Tempe, AZ, for the petitioner-appellants;  P. Bowman of Washington, DC, for the respondent-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

4)  TAXATION / GIFT TAX: Shackleford v. USA, 99-17541 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  A statutory anti-assignment restriction on lottery payments justified departure from the Department of Treasury's annuity tables when determining the asset's present value in calculating estate tax.  O'Scannlain, Tashima, and Thomas (author), Circuit Judges.  AUSA A. Wietecha of Washington, DC, for the defendant-appellant;  S. Richter of San Diego, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

5)  TAXATION:  Boeing v. USA, 99-35818 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  In computing Boeing's research and development costs attributable to its subsidiary domestic international sales corporation's export sales of commercial airplanes, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue properly applied Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.861-8(e)(3) to allocate the R&D costs to its export sales.  Thompson (author), Trott, and Paez, Circuit Judges.  J. Magee of Washington, DC, for the plaintiffs-appellees / cross-appellants;  D. Carmack of Washington, DC, for the defendant-appellant / cross-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

6)  BANKRUPTCY / CONVERSION:  In re Peklar, 00-55464 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001).  A civil judgment in California courts for conversion does not necessarily include a finding that the defendant caused "willful and malicious injury" within the meaning of 11 USC Sec. 523(a)(6);  under Sec. 523(a)(6), a debt for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity" is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.  Hug, Graber, and W. Fletcher (author), Circuit Judges.  A. Epstein of Orange, CA, for the appellant;  S. Kilstofte of Long Beach, CA, for the appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

7)  BANKRUPTCY: In re Vortex Fishing Systems, Inc., 00-15259 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  In determining whether a dispute is bona fide for the purpose of filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition under 11 USC Sec. 303 the proper test is whether there is an objective basis for either a factual or a legal dispute as to the validity of the debt.  Pregerson, Ferguson (author), and Hawkins, Circuit Judges.  M. McGrath of Tuscon, AZ, for the creditors-appellants;  S. Cox of Tuscon, AZ, for the debtor-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

8)  BANKRUPTCY: In re Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage Entities, 00-55919 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2001).  The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding cause to convert a failed Chapter 11 reorganization into a Chapter 7 estate where a corporation entrusted with liquidating the bankruptcy estate caused unreasonable delay by repeatedly failing to account to investors.  Beezer (author), T.G. Nelson, and Berzon, Circuit Judges.  H. Barnhorst of San Diego, CA, for the appellants;  M. Testerman of San Diego, CA, for the appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

 9)  BANKRUPTCY: In re Banks, 00-55229 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001).  Following Resolution Trust v. McKendry, 40 F.3d 331 (10th Cir 1994), two distinct issues must be addressed in a dischargeability analysis—the establishment of the debt itself, which is subject to the state statute of limitations, and the nature of that debt, an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court;  here, the state court action was timely filed and sufficient to establish a debt under the McKendry test and the Bankruptcy Code does not require a debt to be reduced to a pre-petition state court judgment.  McKeown and Fisher, Circuit Judges; and Hagen (author), District Judge.  S. Hogan of Beverly Hills, CA, for the appellant;  E. O'Farrell of Riverside, CA, for the appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

10)  BANKRUPTCY: In re Kieslich, 99-17202 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  An objection to discretionary jurisdiction is waived on appeal if the party fails to raise it first in the bankruptcy court.  O'Scannlain (author) and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges, and Kelleher, District Judge.  K. Mirch of Reno, NV, for the plaintiff;  T. Milton of Washington, DC, for the defendant.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

11)  BANKRUPTCY / TAX LIENS:In re County of Orange, 99-55853 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  Liens on real property securing delinquent state tax penalties in place when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation became the receiver for the property cannot be avoided by the FDIC;  Judge Tashima concurred in the majority's decision except as to Part I where the majority interprets 12 USC Sec. 1825(b)(2) to hold the FDIC liable to Orange County for penalties arising from the failure to pay property taxes when due—so long as those penalties are secured by a lien;  Judge Tashima would reverse the bankruptcy court's disallowance of the FDIC's claims under Sec. 1825(b).  Boochever (author), Tashima (dissenting in part), and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  L. Richmond of Washington, DC, for the appellant-cross-appellee;  J. Persinger of Santa Ana, CA, for the appellee-cross-appellant.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

12)  TORTS:  Barajas v. USA, 99-55599 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2001).  An agreement between the government and a qui tam defendant can be an "alternate remedy" under the False Claims Act, if the agreement allows the government to achieve the same result as if it had intervened, and the government's actions in a first, related claim made it impossible for the relator to proceed with the second claim;  this appeal turned on the proper construction of the phrase "purse its claim through any alternate remedy" and, in the circumstances of this case, a proceeding to suspend or debar a qui tam defendant from entering into contracts with the government is an "alternate remedy" within the meaning of the FCA;  dissenting, Judge Gould did not think the plaintiff was entitled to any proceeds from the agreement because debarment is not an "administrative proceeding to determine a money penalty" or otherwise an "alternative remedy" for an FCA claim.  Pregerson, W. Fletcher (author), and Gould (dissenting), Circuit Judges.  D. Warren of San Diego, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  F. Kortum of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

13)  TORTS / EMPLOYMENT LAW / WESTFALL ACT:  McLachlan v. Bell, 99-16037 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2001).  In a Federal Tort Claims Act case, a certification by the U.S. Attorney under the Westfall Act was proper as all of the defendants' conduct fell within the scope of their employment under California law.  Kleinfeld (author), Hawkins, and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  J. Jackel of San Jose, CA, for the appellant;  AUSA N. Rubin of San Jose, CA, for the appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

14)  EVIDENCE / RAPE SHIELD LAW / SANCTIONS:  S.M. v. J.K., 99-16184 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  Evidence of a sexual assault victim's prior consensual sexual activity may be excluded, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, as a means of sanctioning a party for failing to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 412—here, for failing to file a federal rape shield law motion un-der seal;  the plaintiff's own motion to admit evidence that she had been molested as a child did not open the door to admission of evidence of her voluntary sexual conduct.  B. Fletcher, Canby, and Paez (author), Circuit Judges.  G. Levitt and R. Wilson of Honolulu, HI, for the plaintiff-appellee / cross-appellant;  A. Reinwald of Honolulu, HI, for the defendant-appellant / cross-appellee. (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

15)  INSURANCE:  Gulf USA Corporation v. Federal Insurance Company, 99-35881 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  Discovery of loss for purposes of notice under a fidelity policy takes place when the insured gains knowledge, more than mere suspicion, of the existence of such facts as would justify a careful and prudent person in charging another with fraud or dishonesty.  Pregerson, Thomas, and Gould (author), Circuit Judges.  D. Lombardi of Boise, ID, for the plaintiff-
appellant;  S. Thomas of Boise, ID, for the defendant-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

16)  INSURANCE / ERISA:Waks v. Empire Blue Cross / Blue Shield, 99-17437 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2001).  When an insured exercises her right to convert from a group insurance policy under an ERISA plan to an individual insurance policy, state law claims arising under the individual insurance policy are not preempted by ERISA.  Beezer, O'Scannlain, and W. Fletcher (author), Circuit Judges.  S. Parsons of Las Vegas, NV, for the appellant;  M. Lenz of Reno, NV, for the appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

17)  COMMUNICATION LAW:Cable Arizona Corp. v. Coxcom, Inc., 99-17406 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).  Section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, which gives cable franchisees the right to construct a cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements which have been dedicated for compatible uses, does not allows a cable company access to individual units in a private apartment complex through easement granted to other cable providers unless those easements have been dedicated to a public use.  Reinhardt, Rymer (author), and Fisher, Circuit Judges.  R. Schaffer of Phoenix, CA, for the plaintiff;  D. Rosenbaum and M. Deatherage of Phoenix, AZ, for the defendants.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

18)  ANTITRUST: Pool Water Products v. Olin Corp., 99-56933 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2001).  To show an antitrust injury under the Clayton Act due to a wholly owned subsidiary's predatory pricing, it must be shown that the costs of the parent and the subsidiary together fell below an appropriate measure of costs, and not simply the subsidiary's costs versus its sales.  McKeown and Fisher (author), Circuit Judges, and Hagen, District Judge.  J. Thomas of Irvine, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  P. Halle of Washington, DC, for the defendants-appellees   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

19)  ANTITRUST: Toscano v. Professional Golfers' Assoc., 00-15101 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  The mere acceptance of PGA Tour rules and regulations by sponsors of the Senior PGA Tour did not constitute direct evidence of an agreement to unreasonably restrain trade in violation of Sec. 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Schroeder, Lay, and Thompson (author), Circuit Judges.  P. Smith of Dallas, TX, for the plaintiff-appellant;  A. Hurwitz of Phoenix, AZ, for the defendants.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

20)  CIVIL RICO: Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Stites, 99-56622 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2001).  Under the specific facts of this case, an individual who has been convicted of criminal RICO violations may be held civilly liable for damages flowing from the fraudulent scheme he masterminded, even where some of those damages represent money extracted by co-defendants who were acquitted at their own civil trials.  Alarcon, Trott (author), and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.  L. Schoelch of Encino, CA, for the defendant-appellant;  R. Burnovski of Los Angeles, CA, R. Edwards of San Diego, CA, C. Metzgar of Rancho Cucamonga, CA, and A. Dulaney of Antioch, CA, for the appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

21)  SECURITIES: SEC v. Coldicutt, 99-56169 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion under FRCP 60(b)(5) to end a permanent injunction enjoining her from selling or offering to sell any securities unless and until a registration statement for such securities has been filed with the SEC;  appellant established that she had complied with the injunction for nine years, that the stigma of the injunction had caused her embarrassment, and that there was little likelihood that she will again become active as a securities broker or be involved in the securities business;  however, she failed to show that compliance with the injunction had become substantially more onerous, unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles, detrimental to the public interest, or legally impermissible.  Pregerson, Canby, and Thompson (author), Circuit Judges.  A. Kwoka of San Diego, CA, for the defendant;  T. Karr of Washington, DC, for the plaintiff.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

22)  SECURITIES / ERISA FUND INVESTMENT:  California Ironworkers Field Pension Trust v. Loomis Sayles & Company, 99-56520 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  Adopting the Restatement (Third) of Trusts measure of damages, the USCA held that the trustee of an ERISA employee benefit trust fund, who breaches his fiduciary duty by investing too large an amount in a single security, is personally liable only for such loss as result from the investment of excess beyond the amount it would have been proper to invest.  Kozinski and Tallman, Circuit Judges, and Fogel (author), District Judge.  J. Watson of San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  S. Tichenor of San Francisco, CA, for the defendants-appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

23)  SECURITIES / SANCTIONS: Smith v. Lenches, 00-16582 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2001).  In a securities class action under Sec. 10(b) and Sec. 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, upon gaining in federal district court a dismissal with prejudice of all claims against them, the defendants sought the right to proceed with their counterclaim asking for a declaration that their alleged conduct did not violate state law, an issue then pending in state court;  the district court dismissed the counterclaim without prejudice; concluding that the dismissal of the counterclaim meant to convey no opinion on its merits, the USCA declined to allow a party achieving a complete victory in federal court to seek even more;  in addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose sanctions for fees and costs against the plaintiffs for pursuing parallel actions in state and federal court.  Canby, Hawkins, and Gould (author), Circuit Judges.  W. Dato of San Diego, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellees;  B. Feldman of Palo Also, CA, for the defendants-appellants.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

24)  PENSIONS: Hensley v. Northwest Permanente, 99-35936 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  An employee pension plan administrator had discretion under the terms of the plan to interpret the word "employee," and was not bound by different federal common law definition;  concurring, Judge Rawlinson wrote separately as he thought it was unnecessary to reach the pivotal issue addressed by the majority: whether the plan administrators had discretion to independently define "employee" for purposes of benefit eligibility.  Goodwin, Greenberg (author), and Rawlinson (concurring), Circuit Judges.  J. Acosta of Portland, OR, for the defendants-
appellant;  K. O'Kasey of Portland, OR, for the plaintiffs-appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

25)  LABOR LAW / ERISA:Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans v. N.T. Audio Visual Supply, 98-55611 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  In an action to recover delinquent contributions from an employer under ERISA, if the trustee of the employee benefit plan shows that (1) the defendant employer failed to keep adequate records and (2) there exists some employees who (a) performed work covered by the collective bargaining agreement that was (b) unreported to the trust fund, the burden of production shifts to the employer to show the extent of the unreported covered work for those employees;  dissenting, Judge Pregerson thought the majority had fashioned a rule that imposes a difficult burden of production on Plan Trustees and rewards employers who blatantly violate the record keeping duties imposed by ERISA;  Judge Pregerson thought the majority's rule erodes the burden-shifting standard of Bricks Masons Pension Trust v. Indus. Fence & Supply, Inc., 839 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1988).  Pregerson (dissenting), Noonan, and O'Scannlain (author), Circuit Judges.  L. Rosenthal of Woodland Hills, CA, for the appellant;  S. Holguin of Los Angeles, CA, for the appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

26)  LABOR LAW / MEDICAL PLANS:  Bachelder v. American West Airlines, 99-17458 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).  Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, an employer's selection of a calculating method must be an open rather than a secret act, necessarily carrying with it an obligation to inform its employees of how it calculates leave under the Act;  moreover, as to any leave re-quest made before the employer has selected a calculating method, the employer may properly be held to the rule that "the option that provides the most beneficial outcome for the employee" shall be used.  Reinhardt, Tashima, and Berzon (author), Circuit Judges.  W. Hobson of Tempe, AZ, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  D. Barr of Phoenix, AZ, for the defendant-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

27)  CONTRACTS / LABOR LAW:Soltani v. Western & Southern Life Insurance Company, 99-56612 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  Contractual provisions that require employees to give an employer 10 days written notice of "the particulars of a claim" prior to filing suit are unconscionable and unenforceable under California law;  contractual provisions that shorten statutes of limitation to six months (applied to a suit for wrongful termination or unfair business practices) are not unconscionable and unenforceable under California law.  Hug and B. Fletcher, Circuit Judges, and King (author), District Judge.  E. Serbin of Long Beach, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  A. Schneider of Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

28)  ADMIRALTY LAW: Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. v. Okamoto Freighters, Ltd., 00-55358 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  In an action for indemnity from a non-vessel-operating common carrier ("NVOCC"), following the rejection of ten containers shipped from Long Beach, CA, to Tokyo, Japan, which the bill of lading said contained cigarettes but actually contained old tires, the district court correctly concluded that the NVOCC breached its warranty as to the accuracy of the particulars in the bill of lading and that it had no defenses to the claim for indemnity;  however, the USCA reversed and remanded the district court's calculation of damages.  Hug, Trott (author), and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.  F. Dipolito of Long Beach, CA, for the appellant;  M. O'Brien and T. Jorgensen of Long Beach, CA, and M. Lodwick of Santa Ana, CA, for the appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

29)  ADMIRALTY LAW: Myers v. American Triumph F/V, 00-35157 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001).  No private action is available to attack a vessel's taking of ferae fish pursuant to a Certificate of Documentation and Fishery Endorsement issued by the U.S. Coast Guard under 46 USC Secs 12101-12122 after the issuance of the certificate.  Alarcon, Fernandez (author), and Tashima, Circuit Judges.  S. Berman of Seattle, WA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  J. Zulauf of Seattle, WA, for the claimants-appellees. (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

30)  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  Cripe v. City of San Jose, 99-15253 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).  A city's policy that categorically restricts the jobs police officers with disabilities can perform to a small number of undesirable jobs in which they have little or no possibility for promotion cannot be reconciled the ADA's "clear and comprehensive national mandate" to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.  Reinhardt (author), Tashima, and Berzon, Circuit Judges.  F. Jelinch of Cupertino, CA, and D. Jensen of Milpitas, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  C. Greenberg of San Jose, CA, for the defendant-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

31)  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  Thornton v. McClatchy Newspaper, 99-15857 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001).  The plaintiff, who showed an inability to work as a newspaper reporter but failed to present sufficient evidence of preclusion from other jobs and of the relevant job market, failed to show a disability within the meaning of the ADA;  the district court properly granted the defendant summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff presented no genuine issue of material fact showing that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA;  the USCA vacated summary judgment on the plaintiff's California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") claims and remanded for reconsideration in light of statutory changes to California law.  Judge Berzon concurred in the majority's "regarded as disabled," FEHA, and Leave to Amend holdings, but dissented from the majority's holdings that the plaintiff failed to established that she is "substantially limited" in the "major life activities" of performing manual tasks or working.  Kozinski, Hawkins (author), and Berzon (dissenting in part), Circuit Judges.  W. Whelan of Fresno, CA, for the plaintiffs;  K. Morrison of Sacramento, CA, for the defendant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

32)  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 99-35934 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2001).  To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant;  the appro-priate test for intentional discrimination under the ADA is "deliberate indifference."  Reinhardt (author), Rymer (dissenting), and Fisher, Circuit Judges.  L. Davis of Seattle, WA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  R. Hauge of Port Orchard, WA, for the defendants-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

33)  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 99-56221 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  An architect who designs a public accommodation building (e.g., a movie theater) that does not comply with Sec. 12183(a) of the ADA is not liable for discrimination under Title III of the Act unless the architect is also an owner, lessee, lessor, or operator of the non-compliant building.  D.W. Nelson, O'Scannlain (author), and Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges.  T. Kilpatrick of San Diego, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  G. Hurley of Newport Beach, CA, for the defendants-appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

34)  COMMERCE CLAUSE: Ponderosa Dairy v. Lyons, 99-16981 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001).  Section 144 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act insulates California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenges, including 1997 amendments that subjected out-of-state dairies to California's milk pooling plan.  Sneed and Silverman, Circuit Judges, and Sedwick (author), District Judge.  C. English of Washington, DC, for the plaintiffs;  A. Henningsen of San Francisco, CA, for the defendants.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

35)  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: Hall v. EPA, 99-70853 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2001).  To determine whether a revision to an air quality plan meets Clean Air Act air quality requirements, the EPA must be able to conclude that the revisions are consistent with the development of an overall plan capable of meeting the Act's air quality aims of reducing pollution.  Goodwin, Graber, and Paez (author), Circuit Judges.  A. Mergen of Washington, DC, for the respondent;  R. Hall pro se.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

36)  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 00-15700 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001).  Deep plowing to permit the farming of crops that require deep root systems ("deep ripping") can constitute a discharge of a pollutant in violation of the Clean Water Act when it occurs in protected wetland swales;  dissenting, Judge Gould thought that the Clean Water Act did not prohibit deep ripping in this setting and that the return of soil in place after deep plowing was not a discharge of a pollutant.  Canby, Hawkins (author), and Gould (dissenting), Circuit Judges.  A. Coon of Walnut Creek, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  S. Quast of Washington, DC, for the defendants-appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

37)  ENERGY LAW: Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonneville Power Administration, 00-70559 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2001).  Direct service industrial customers of the Bonneville Power Administration are entitled to purchase under the IP-96 rate the amount of power each agreed to purchase under 1981 power sales contracts or the 1996 Block Sales Contracts;  the FPS-96 rate is the rate applicable to all power surplus to those contractual obligations.  Goodwin, Greenberg, and Rawlinson (author), Circuit Judges.  P. Murphy of Helena, MT, and AUCA K. Sciuchetti of Portland, OR, for the intervenors;  AUSA T. Lee of Portland, OR, for the respon-dent.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

38)  EDUCATION: Amanda J. v. Clark County School District, 99-17157 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001).  A school district's failure to disclose upon a parent's request evaluations indicating the possibility of autism and the need for further psychiatric evaluations once the district learned of the diagnosis, violates the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act program and denies the child a free and appropriate public education.  Hawkins, McKeown, and Wardlaw (author), Circuit Judges.  G. Clancy of Sacramento, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  D. Mitchell of Las Vegas, NV, for the defendant-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

39)  HOUSING:  Walker v. City of Lakewood, 00-55060 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2001).  An independent fair housing provider engaged in advocacy may sue the city with whom it contracts for retaliating in response to that advocacy under the federal Fair Housing Act and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act;  if the city's actions result in direct and immediate injuries to the independent provider, time, money, or business lost can be directly redressed by a damage award.  Noonan, Silverman, and Paez (author), Circuit Judges.  B. Litt of Los Angeles, CA, for the counter-claimant-appellant;  K. Pelletier of Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

40)  HOUSING / IMMUNITY:Kimberly Associates v. USA, 99-35188 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).  When the government enacted narrow and targeted legislation aimed at encouraging federal loan recipients to provide more low income housing, the doctrine of unmistakability did not apply;  the doctrine requires that for the United States to waive its sovereign rights when entering into a contract with a private citizen, it must do so in unmistakable terms;  however, when the government is acting as a private contracting party, the doctrine does not apply, and the government's rights and duties are governed by law applicable to private parties unaltered by the government's sovereign status.  Reavley, Fernandez, and Thomas (author), Circuit Judges.  J. Ward of Boise, ID, for the plaintiff;  AUSA N. Woychick of Boise, ID, for the defendant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

41)  ATTORNEYS' FEES:  Bennett v. Yoshina, 00-16137 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  A party is not entitled to attorneys' fees intended by statute for a prevailing party if it obtained the relief it sought only as a catalyst—that is, if it achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct;  in the instant case, the plaintiffs claim that they are the prevailing parties because the Hawaii legislature passed a law that did what plaintiffs sought to have done in litigation;  as they advanced only a catalyst theory, the USCA affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees.  B. Fletcher (author), Canby, and Paez, Circuit Judges.  M. Bennett of Honolulu, HI, and S. Michaels of New York, NY, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  D. Sellers of Honolulu, HI, for the de-fendants-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

42)  ATTORNEYS' FEES:Sea Coast Foods v. Lu-Mar Lobsters & Shrimp, Inc., 99-36156 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001).  A party's acceptance of an offer to pay costs under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 68 did not establish a right to attorneys' fees.  Alarcon, Fernandez (author), and Tashima, Circuit Judges.  A. Gewald of Seattle, WA, for the appellants;  R. Medved of Bellevue, WA, for the appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

43)  SANCTIONS: Navellier v. Sletten, 99-17059 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  A special master abused his discretion in failing to give a party and his counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions for abusive and oppressive discovery requests.  Canby, Hawkins, and Gould (author), Circuit Judges.  S. Kornhauser of San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  R. Alldredge of Palo Also, CA, for the defendants-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

44)  DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:Lee v. American National Insurance, 99-15846 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).  In a diversity action removed from state court, the entire case need not be remanded if the plaintiffs lacks Article II standing as to one of several defen-dants;  concurring in part and in the judgment, Judge Kozinski said he could not sign on to Part II.2.A of the majority's opinion as it needlessly complicated the question of whether the district court properly removed the case from state court.  Kozinski (concurring in part), Hawkins, and Berzon (author), Circuit Judges.  M. Seth Weiner of Burlingame, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  J. Wagstaffe of San Francisco, CA, for the defendants-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

45)  DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:Gibson v. Chrysler Corporation, 99-16436 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2001). There is supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members when the claim of an individual named plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 USC Sec. 1332;  however, the claims of unnamed class members cannot serve as a basis for diversity jurisdiction.  Schroeder, Hall, and W. Fletcher (author), Circuit Judges.  F. Scarpulla and G. Saveri of San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  C. Newman of St. Louis, MO, for the defendant-appellee. (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

46)  JURISDICTION / FEDERALISM:Labor / Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transpor-tation Authority, 99-56581 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2001).  Federalism did not prevent a federal district court from enforcing a consent decree between the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and bus passengers in settlement of a civil rights lawsuit concerning the quality of bus service in the passengers' community;  dissenting, Judge Hall thought that the district court failed to fully consider limitations on its remedial authority that, in tailoring a remedy, it should exercise the least possible power adequate to the end proposed, and, where the remedy is directed toward a state or local governmental entity, it must give appropriate consideration to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief, and that it should always seek to minimize interference with legitimate state activities in tailoring remedies.  Browning, Hall (dissenting), and Silverman (author), Circuit Judges.  S. Hufstedler of Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant;  E. Larson of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiffs.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

47)  JURISDICTION: Ahmed v. State of Washington, 00-35660 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  A district court that had jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff's claim at the time the complaint was filed, but while a state court judgment on the plaintiff's inextricably intertwined claim was pending, was deprived of jurisdiction by the state court before the federal jury returned its verdict;  under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court did not have jurisdiction over the suit.  Noonan, Tashima (author), and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  M. Lynch of Olympia, WA, for the defendants-appellants;  C. Wiggins of Bainbridge Island, WA, for the plaintiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

48)  FORUM NON CONVENIENS:Leetsch v. Freedman, 99-56898 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001).  In dismissing an civil suit for forum non conveniens, the district court did not need to impose conditions retaining jurisdiction and providing for return jurisdiction over the defendants when there was no indication that the defendants would evade or obstruct an action in Germany;  concurring in the judgment, Judge Berzon thought that as the defendants' amenability to service of process in Germany had not been disputed, Germany was an adequate alternative forum.  Beezer (author), T.G. Nelson, and Berzon (concurring), Circuit Judges.  D. Shaub of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  P. Engstrom of San Francisco, CA, for the defendants-appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

49)  SUMMARY JUDGMENTS:Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni, 99-15716 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  As an alternative to stepping into the shoes of an unavailable district judge under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 63, a successor judge may examine the trial transcript as if it were "supporting affidavits" for summary judgment purposes and enter summary judgment if no credibility determinations are required;  thus, Rule 63 is not violated when no material facts are in dispute and the successor judge rules as a matter of law.  Hug (author), Noonan, and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.  C. Rillo of San Francisco, CA, for the appellants;  M. Hoffman of San Francisco, CA, for the appellees. (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

50)  CIVIL PROCEDURE:Seven Words LLC v. Network Solutions, 99-56909 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001).  A request for damages made for the first time in the court of appeals did not overcome the determination that the case was moot where the party had not otherwise requested damages in its complaint but had sought only injunctive and declaratory relief;  although a timely claim for damages could have saved the case from dismissal for mootness, the plaintiff earlier eschewed that avenue for tactical reasons and never sought damages until supplemental briefing on appeal and only in a last-ditch effort to avoid dismissal;  the general prayer for relief in the complaint is insufficient to create a claim for damages under these circumstances.  Magill, McKeown (author), and Fisher, Circuit Judges.  J. Spillane of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  S. Wilson of Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

51)  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:Rivera v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 99-71278 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  A discretionary decision of the Railroad Retirement Board not to extend the time period for requesting judicial review is not a final decision of the Board on the merits;  hence, it is not subject to review by the court of appeals.  Magill (author), McKeown, and Fisher, Circuit Judges.  W. Curtis of Tucson, AZ, for the petitioner;  K. Johnson of Chicago, IL, for the respondent.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

52)  POSSE COMITATUS ACT:USA v. Hitchcock, 00-10251 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2001).  Military participation in a civilian criminal investigation for the purpose of determining the extent to which certain illegal drugs were being used and distributed on a military base fell under the "independent military purpose" exception and thus did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act, 10 USC Sec. 375.  B. Fletcher (author), Canby, and Paez, Circuit Judges.  S. Courageous of Honolulu, HI, for the defendant;  S. Alm of Honolulu, HI, for the plaintiff.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

53)  SOCIAL SECURITY: Bustamante v. Massanari, 99-17194 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  An ALJ may consider whether alcoholism is a contributing factor to a claimant's disability only once he has determined disability under the five-step sequential disability inquiry prescribed in 20 CFR Secs. 404.1520 and 416.920.  B. Fletcher, Fernandez, and Paez (author), Circuit Judges.  H. Sackett of San Jose, CA, for the plaintiff;  L. Li of San Francisco, CA, for the defendant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

54)  SOCIAL SECURITY: Mayes v. Massanari, 00-35181 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  An ALJ's special duty in Social Security cases to develop the record to ensure that a claimant's interests are considered does not include a duty to develop the record by diagnosing the claimant's disability.  Tashima and Tallman, Circuit Judges, and Mollway (author), District Judge.  J. Johnson of Butte, MT, for the plaintiff-appellant;  AUSA D. Sandholm of Helena, MT, for the defendant-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

55)  SOCIAL SECURITY: Rollins v. Massanari, 99-55977 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).  While a disability benefits claimant's subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected by an ALJ on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is a relevant factor in determining the severity of the pain and its disabling effects;  dissenting, Judge Ferguson thought the majority glossed over the record and attempted to reintroduce a standard that an en banc panel had unequivocally rejected ten years ago, and, in so doing, it reached a conclusion contrary to the testimony of the vocational expert.  Ferguson (dissenting), Tashima (author), and Fisher, Circuit Judges.  B. Potter of Pasadena, CA, for the plaintiff;  P. Okin of San Francisco, CA, for the de-fendant.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

56)  SOCIAL SECURITY: Vertigan v. Halter, 99-35787 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001).  A claimant for disability benefits under the Social Security Act who has managed certain daily activities such as grocery shopping, driving a car, and limited walking for exercise, has not thereby reduced her credibility as to her overall disability.  Lay (author), Trott, and Berzon, Circuit Judges.  M. Taller of Anaheim, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  V. Blais of Seattle, WA, for the defendant-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

57)  MEDICARE: Alhambra Hospital v. Thompson, 99-57009 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  Hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients may include subacute patient days in the "disproportionate share" calculation for increased Medicare reimbursement.  Rymer, Hawkins (author), and Gould, Circuit Judges. J. Neustadter of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  M. Davies of Washington, DC, for the defendant-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

58)  MEDICARE / FALSE CLAIMS  ACT / DAMAGES:  USA v. Mackby, 99-15605 (9th Cir.  The opinion filed March 21, 2001 has been withdrawn and a new one filed on Aug. 16, 2001).  The owner and managing director of a physical therapy clinic knowingly causes false claims to be submitted to Medicare when, following his instructions, the provider identification number of a physician who does not provide services at the clinic is used on billing claim forms;  the USCA remanded the case to the district court for its consideration of whether the statutory penalty and the treble damages awarded are unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment.  Thompson (author), O'Scannlain, and Tashima, Circuit Judges.  P. Hooper of Los Angeles, CA, for the appellant;  AUSA G. Killefer of San Francisco, CA, for the appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

59)  EMERGENCY TREATMENT: Baker v. Adventist Health, Inc., 00-15273 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  A community hospital that lacked the capability to perform mental health screenings but called in a "crisis worker" from the county mental health department to screen a patient for a psychiatric emergency did not violate the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, although that patient later committed suicide.  Schroeder (author), Lay, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.  R. Massa of Lakeport, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  M. Tilner of Encino, CA, for the defendant-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

60)  CIVIL RIGHTS: Knox v. Davis, 98-55871 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).  A party seeking relief under 42 USC Sec. 1983 for alleged acts of discrimination which occurred outside the applicable state limitations period must show that the acts are related closely enough to constitute a "continuing violation," and that the least one of the acts fell within the limitations period;  dissenting, Judge Schwarzer thought the majority's analysis misconceived the issue and that its citations did not support its conclusion.  Brunetti (author) and Tashima, Circuit Judges, and Schwarzer (dissenting), District Judge.  M. Knox pro per;  E. Angres of Los Angeles, CA, for the appel-lees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

61)  FREEDOM OF SPEECH:Clark v. City of Lakewood, 99-35453 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  The City of Lakewood's failure to provide adult cabaret managers with temporary licenses during a 21-day license application period established under the City's new adult cabaret ordinance constitutes a prior restraint in violation of the State of Washington Constitution.  B. Fletcher and Fisher (author), Circuit Judges, and Schwarzer, District Judge.  J. Burns of Bellevue, WA, for the plaintiff;  P. Brennan of Tacoma, WA, for the defendant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

62)  FREEDOM OF SPEECH:California Teachers Association v. State Board of Education, 99-56784 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2001).  The parental enforcement provision of Proposition 227, a California ballot initiative which restricts the use of languages other than English by educators in public schools, is not unconstitutionally vague on its face;  dissenting, Judge Tashima thought the provision at issue raised three concerns underlying the First Amendment vagueness doctrine—a lack of fair notice, a threat of ad hoc and subjective enforcement, and a chilling effect on protected expression.  Boochever (author), Tashima (dissenting), and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  J. Collins of Washington, DC, for the plaintiffs-appellants;  D. Cole of San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-appellee;  E. Grant of Sac-ramento, CA, for the defendants-intervenors-
appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

63)  FREEDOM OF SPEECH / DISORDERLY CONDUCT:  USA v. Poocha, 00-10283 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  A defendant's use of profanity in expressing disapproval of police conduct was protected speech and did not provide a lawful basis for a conviction under the federal disorderly conduct statute; concurring, Judge Berzon wrote separately to add a caveat:  to her it is all-important that the indictment charged the defendant only with using language in a manner that was likely to incite an immediate breach of the peace, not with violating any other provision of the applicable regulation, such as engaging in an act that is physically threatening;  she also thought that, while a reference to "speech" might include expressive conduct and thereby encompass gestures that could be interpreted as physically threatening, "language" does not;  Judge Tashima concurred in that part of the majority opinion which affirmed the conviction for failure to obey a lawful order, but dissented from that part of the opinion which reversed the conviction for disorderly con-duct.  Reinhardt (author), Tashima (dissenting in part), and Berzon (concurring), Circuit Judges.  Q. Denvir of Fresno for the peti-tioner;  P. Seave of Sacramento, CA, for the respondent.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/)

64)  FREEDOM OF SPEECH:Bauer v. Sampson, 99-56964 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001).  The district court correctly ruled that a community college administrative regulation proscribing speech by employees containing "violent behavior overtones," but falling short of being threatening, is unconstitutional on its face;  however, it erred in holding that the entire workplace violence policy is facially unconstitutional;  dissenting, Judge Hawkins thought the regulation was not facially unconstitutional:  standing alone, the prohibition on expression with "violent behavior overtones" is unconstitutionally overbroad, but he thought the prohibition "cannot sustain an overbreadth challenge because it does not reach a 'substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,'" quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489 (1982).  Rymer, Hawkins (author), and Gould (dissenting in part), Circuit Judges.  D. Larsen of Costa Mesa, CA, for the defendant-appellant;  C. Sobel of Santa Monica, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

65)  FREEDOM OF SPEECH: Edwards v. Coeur d'Alene, 00-35537 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2001).  A city ordinance prohibiting the carrying of signs attached to wooden or plastic handles during parades and public assemblies is unconstitutional under the First Amendment as an invalid time, place, and manner restriction on speech.  Pregerson (author), Tashima, and Thomas, Circuit Judges.  B. Brown of Tupelo, Mississippi, for the plaintiff;  S. Weeks of Coeur d'Alene, ID, for the defendant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

66)  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: Culbertson v. Oakridge School District, 99-35165 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  In allowing its school to be used after-hours by non-school community groups, a school district created a limited public forum to which it may not deny access on the grounds of religious viewpoint and content;  that use of the school did not constitute an establishment of religion.  Noonan (author), Graber, and Fisher, Circuit Judges.  L. Lear of Portland, OR, for the appellants;  G. Baylor of Beaverton, OR, for the appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

67)  FIRST AMENDMENT:Morrison v. Hall, 98-35468 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).  Oregon Administrative Rule 291-131-025(6), prohibiting inmates from receiving bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail, is unconstitutional as applied to pre-paid, for-profit, subscription publications.  Pregerson (author), Ferguson, and Hawkins, Circuit Judges.  M. Johns of Davis, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  K. McDonald of Salem, OR, for the defendants-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

68)  FREEDOM OF RELIGION:Paulson v. San Diego, 00-55406 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001).  A City's privatizing of a 43-foot high Latin cross and the land beneath it, leaving it surrounded by publicly maintained park land, did not violate the Establishment Clause, as the land was sold to the highest bidder through a well-publicized, neutral bidding process that did not require the successful bidder to maintain the cross on the property;  the district court earlier had issued an injunction against the cross's presence on publicly owned land for violation of the California Constitution;  in response, the City sold half an acre beneath the cross;  the district court found the sale sufficient to cure the constitutionally impermissibly appearance of preference for religion by the City.  Hug (author), Duhe, and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  J. McElroy of San Diego, CA, for the appellant;  C. Gwinn and C. Berwanger of San Diego, CA, for the ap-pellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

69)  NATIVE AMERICAN LAW:EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 00-16181 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001).  Under the circumstances of this case, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to an Indian tribe's employment relationship with a member of the tribe.  Hill, Graber, and McKeown (author) Circuit Judges.  R. Liechty of Denver, CO, for the defendant-appellant;  B. Sloan of Washington, DC, for the plaintiff-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

70)  IMMIGRATION: Valderrama v. INS, 99-71591 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001).  The BIA's denial of asylum based on its finding that the petitioner lacked credibility was supported by substantial evidence where the applicant's first and second petitions for asylum differed in material ways that went to the heart of her asylum claims;  dissenting in part, Judge Pregerson agreed with the majority that the adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence, but he thought the mandate should be stayed to allow the petitioner the opportunity to move the BIA to reopen her case so that she could apply for an adjustment of status based on her marriage to a U.S. citizen, as unless the mandate is stayed, she will most likely be deported before she has the chance to move the BIA to reopen her de-portation proceedings.  Pregerson (dissenting in part), Fernandez, and Graber, Circuit Judges.  Per Curiam.  J. Lazaro of San Francisco, CA, for the petitioner;  L. Jentzer of Washington, DC, for the respondent.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

71)  IMMIGRATION: Li v. Eddy, 97-35814 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") divests federal courts of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas petition filed by a party seeking relief from an expedited removal order;  dissenting, Judge Hawkins thought the case should be remanded so that the habeas petition could be considered on the merits;  he thought the case presented an important question under IIRIRA—whether the holder of a valid visa to enter the United States can seeks habeas corpus review when unlawfully issued an expedited removal order by the INA.  Schroeder, Beezer, and Hawkins (dissenting), Circuit Judges.  Per Curiam.  M. Stock of Anchorage, AK, for the petitioner-appellant;  H. Mullane of Washington, DC, for the respondent-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

72)  IMMIGRATION: Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 00-70096 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2001).  A state court order vacating an aggravated felony conviction does not terminate removal proceedings charging the defendant with being an alien convicted of an aggravated fel-ony;  concurring in the result, Judge Gould reached the result via the plain language of 8 USC Sec. 1101(a)(48)
(A).  Canby, Hawkins (author), and Gould (concurring), Circuit Judges.  M. Franquinha of Phoenix, AZ, for the petitioner;  A. Tabaddor of Washington, DC, for the respondent.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

73)  IMMIGRATION: Zavaleta-Gallegos v. INS, 99-71017 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2001).  The USCA lacked jurisdiction to review the petition of an alien opposing deportation on the ground that he is not removable for a criminal conviction because it occurred prior to the granting of his visa application;  under 8 USC Sec. 1252(a)(2)(C) the USCA lacks jurisdiction to review final orders of removal if the petitioner is removable for committing an enumerated criminal offense;  the USCA concluded that the petitioner here is removable under the statute because of his criminal conviction.  Pregerson (author), Canby, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.  A. Bustamante of Los Angeles, CA, for the petitioner;  L. Arnold of Washington, DC, for the respondent.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

74)  RIGHT TO COUNSEL:USA v. Nguyen, 00-10272 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  A district court's refusal to grant a defendant's request for a continuance to enable him to obtain new counsel, where there had been a breakdown in the relationship between the defendant and his counsel, was an abuse of discretion that violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel:  the district court abused its discretion when it (1) failed to create an adequate record to support its denial of the continuance; (2) failed to display adequate concern for the defendant's understanding of and participation in the trial; and (3) provided improper reason for denying the continuance;  the district judge had apparently made up his mind that he was not going to grant a continuance without even hearing from the defendant, and, in fact, decided this at a meeting the defendant di not even attend;  due process is violated when fundamental constitutional rights are so decided.  Wright, Choy, and Ferguson (author), Circuit Judges.  H. Trapp of Hagatna, Guam for the defen-dant-appellant;  F. Black of Hagatna, Guam for the plaintiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

75)  SEARCH & SEIZURE: Fontana v. Haskin, 99-56629 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001).  An officer's sexual, verbal, and physical acts against a handcuffed arrestee deprives her of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure;  the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged a 42 USC Sec. 1983 cause of action arising out of the officer's allegedly sexually harassing behavior.  Hug and B. Fletcher (author), Circuit Judges, and King, District Judge.  S. Kaufman of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  V. Shalkevich of Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

76)  SEARCH & SEIZURE: Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 99-16118 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2001).  After being arrested for attempting to use a senior / disabled bus pass and an expired picture identification, Arpin bought an action for false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, race-based violence or intimidation, breach of common carrier's duty of case, and unlawful strip search;  the district court erred in dismissing the false arrest and imprison-
ment claims against the bus driver and two sheriff deputies and the state law false arrest and imprisonment claims against Transportation Agency defendants;  all of Arpin's other claims were without merit.  Wallace, Fisher, and Rawlinson (author), Circuit Judges.  H. Moore of Oakland, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  S. Hightower of San Jose, CA, for the defendants-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

77)  SEARCH & SEIZURE: USA v. Mendoza-Ortiz, 99-50255 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001).  A warrantless search of a vehicle pursuant to a valid border inspection that uncovered contraband did not justify a warrantless search of the defendant's workplace, even though the contraband had been brought into the United States and unloaded from the vehicle at the workplace.  Browning, Pregerson, and Beezer, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam.  Y. Barrera of Arcadia, CA, for the defendants;  AUSA D. Pauli of Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

78)  SEARCH & SEIZURE: USA v. Pinela-Hernandez, 00-50371 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  The evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to support the conclusion that Customs Service agents had probable cause to search the defendant's car where they had been tipped off that a different vehicle containing drugs would cross the border, and that vehicle was put under surveillance and followed to a residence where suspicious activity surrounded the car eventually searched, the defendant attempted to evade the agents, and the defendant's car contained a suspicious-looking package in plain view.  Hug, Graber, and W. Fletcher (author), Circuit Judges.  V. Brunkow of San Diego, CA, for the defendants-appellants;  E. Weiner of San Diego, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

79)  MONEY LAUNDERING / EVIDENCE: USA v. Barragan, 00-30335 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2001).  Evidence that monies wired to the defendant were proceeds of an unlawful drug enterprise was sufficient to support a conviction for money laundering in violation of 18 USC Sec. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  Alarcon (author), Fernandez, and Tashima, Circuit Judges.  E. Sheehy of Helena, MT, for the defendant;  AUSA J. Van de Wetering of Missoula, MT, for the plaintiff.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

80)  EVIDENCE: USA v. LeMay, 00-30193 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001).  The admission of prior acts of child molestation under Federal Rules of Evidence 414 does not violate a defendant's due process rights where the federal balancing-test rule was applied in a manner allowing for meaningful appellate review;  Rule 403 remains applicable to evidence introduced under Rule 414, and, if conscientiously applied, will protect defendants from propensity evidence so inflammatory as to jeopardize their right to a fair trial;  Judge Paez dissented from the majority's holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 403;  he would reverse that ruling and remand for reconsideration in light of Doe by Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000).  Wood, Trott (author), and Paez (dissenting in part), Circuit Judges. J. Rhodes of Missoula, MT, for the defendant;  M. Sept and L. Simotas of Billings, MT, for the plaintiff.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

81)  WIRETAPS: Price v. Turner, 00-15026 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2001).  The interception of private cordless phone communications prior to 1994 did not violate the Wiretap Act.  Schroeder (author), Lay, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.  W. Dresser of San Jose, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant;  M. Manning of Sacramento, CA, for the defendants-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

82)  EMBEZZLEMENT: USA v. Hayden, 00-50555 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001).  Embezzlement is covered be 18 USC Sec. 661 (1994), which makes it an offense to take and carry away, with intent to steal or purloin, any personal property of another within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  Rymer and Rawlinson, Circuit Judges, and Restani (author), U.S. Court of Intl. Trade Judge.  FPD B. Coleman of San Diego, CA, for the appellant;  AUSA R. Cheng of San Diego, CA, for the appel-lee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

83)  SEVERANCE: USA v. Angwin, 00-50276 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2001).  With respect to whether the codefendants trials should be severed due to antagonistic defenses, the USCA held that one defendant's defense based on ignorance was not irreconcilable with another defendant's defense based on duress;  dissenting in part, Judge Ferguson did not think there was sufficient evidence to establish that one of the defendants was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .  Ferguson (dissenting in part) and Silverman, Circuit Judges, and Breyer (author), District Judge.  J. Levine of Encino, CA, for the defendant;  G. Vega and B. Castetter of San Diego, CA, for the plaintiff.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

84)  CAR BOMBS: USA v. Geiger, 99-30393 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2001).  A leased truck used in the national truck leasing market is "used in" an activity affecting interstate commerce for purposes of the crime of malicious destruction of a vehicle used in and affecting interstate commerce in violation of 18 USC Sec. 844(i).  Pregerson, Thomas (author), Gould, Circuit Judges.  J. Pharr of Anchorage, AK, for the appellant;  AUSA S. Skrocki of Anchorage, AK, for the appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

85)  POSSESSION OF A FIREARM:USA v. Purdy, 00-30168 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2001).  To sustain a conviction as an "unlawful user" of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 USC Sec. 922(g)(3), the government must prove, as it did here, that the defendant took drugs with regularity, over an extended period of time, and contemporaneously with his purchase or possession of a firearm."  Pregerson (author), Thomas, and Gould, Circuit Judges.  FPD C. Hunt of Spokane, WA, for the defendant;  AUSA J. Kirk of Yakima, WA, for the plaintiff.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

86)  FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM:  USA v. Laskie, 00-10437 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  A conviction which has been expunged or set aside, or for which a person has been pardoned or has had his or her civil rights restored, cannot be used as the predicate felony under 18 USC Sec. 922(g)(1) in a federal prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm unless the certificate or other written document granting such pardon expressly forbids that person from possessing firearms.  Goodwin, Graber (author), and McKeown, Circuit Judges.  AFPD M. Kennedy of Reno, NV, for the defendant;  AUSA J. Damm of Las Vegas, NV, for the plaintiff.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/
 

87)  DISORDERLY CONDUCT: USA v. Coutchavlis, 00-10349 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001).  For purposes of 36 CFR Sec. 2.34(a)(2), a disorderly conduct regulation that proscribes acts intended to cause public harm, an act is "public" if it occurs on a public highway, whether or not there are witnesses.  Hill, Graber, and McKeown (author), Circuit Judges.  AFPD O. Vallejo of Fresno, CA, for the defendant-appellant;  AUSA S. Boone of Fresno, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

88)  DISORDERLY CONDUCT: USA v. Taylor, 00-10507 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001).  There is no disorderly conduct under 36 CFR Sec. 2.34(a)(2) unless the proscribed behavior occurs in public.  Hill (author), Graber, and McKeown, Circuit Judges.  AFPD A. Voris of Fresno, CA, for the defendant;  AUSA S. Boone of Fresno, CA, for the plaintiff.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

89)  CAPITAL CASES: Payton v. Woodford, 00-99000 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  A prosecutor's argument to the jury during the penalty phase of a capital prosecution that the jury need not consider mitigating evidence of a claimed religious conversion, which allegedly occurred after the charged crimes, was harmless error as it was ameliorated by the trial court's admonishment to the jury and instructions, and the prosecutor's subsequent concession that there was some merit to the evidence; the USCA thus disagreed with district court's conclusion that the prosecutor's closing argument rendered the petitioner's penalty trial fundamentally unfair;  dissenting in part, Judge Hawkins agreed with the district court that the petitioner was deprived of his due process rights in the penalty phase of his trial.  Rymer (author), Hawkins (dissenting in part), and Gould, Circuit Judges.  N. Palmieri of San Diego, CA, for the respondent-appellant / cross-appellee;  R. Rakoff and D. Gits of Santa Monica, CA, for the petitioner-appellee / cross-appellant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

90)  SENTENCING: USA v. Castro-Hernandez, 01-50192 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  A two-level upward adjustment in sentencing under USSG Sec. 3B1.4, for the use of a minor to assist in avoiding detection of the offense, may apply to a defendant who intentionally uses a minor as a decoy.  Hug, Graber (author), and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.  G. Burcham of San Diego, CA, for the defendant-appellant;  AUSA D. Scott of San Diego, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

91)  SENTENCING: Gunn v. Ignacio, 99-16186 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2001).  A prosecutor who in a plea agreement agrees not to oppose the imposition of concurrent sentences, but then concurs in the findings of a presentence report that recommends consecutive sentences, effectively opposes concurrent sentences and breaches the plea agreement.  Kleinfeld (author), Hawkins, and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  AFPD D. Johnson of Las Vegas, NV, for the appellant;  A. Banales of Carson City, NV, for the appellees.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

92)  SENTENCING: USA v. Gonzales, 00-50283 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001).  The sentencing enhancement under USSG Sec. 3B1.4 for the use of a minor in the commission of a crime does not have a scienter requirement.  Hawkins, Tashima, and Gould, Circuit Judges.  Per Curiam.  E. Uhrig of Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellant;  AUSA J. Zwicker of Los Angeles, CA, for the plain-tiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

93)  SENTENCING: USA v. Rodriguez, 99-30219 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001).  A sentence beyond the statutory maximum for a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana was improper where the trial court instructed the jury that the government was not required to prove the amount or quantity of marijuana charged in the indictment and that it need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a measurable or detectable amount.  Noonan (author), Tashima, and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  S. Fox of Tucson, AZ, for the defendant;  AUSA J. Seykora of Billings, MT, for the plaintiff.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

94)  SENTENCING: USA v. Trinidad-Aquino, 00-10013 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).  A conviction for drunk driving resulting in bodily injury to another, in violation of California Vehicle Code Sec. 23153 is not an aggravated felony under 18 USC Sec. 16 for purposes of sentence enhancement for being previously deported after conviction of an aggravated felony;  dissenting Judge Kozinski found the majority's opinion contrary to the law of the Circuit and common sense;  he noted that the definition of "aggravated felony" in Sec. 16(b) was satisfied:  driving a vehicle while intoxicated and then killing or injuring somebody is the classic example of an offense that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk" that physical force will be used against another.  Kozinski (dissenting), Hawkins (author), and Berzon, Circuit Judges.  M. Rotker of San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiff;  S. Kalar of San Francisco, CA, for the defendant.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

95)  SENTENCING: USA v. Mendoza, 00-10276 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  A "vulnerable victim" sentencing enhancement under USSG Sec. 3A1.1(b) was properly imposed on a defendant posing as an immigration expert who sold false English-language immigration documents to non-English speaking illegal aliens who had little education or familiarity of  immigration law.  Kleinfeld (author), Hawkins, and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  AFPD D. Blank of San Francisco, CA, for the appellant;  AUSA H. Gilliam of San Francisco, CA, for the appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

96)  SENTENCING: USA v. Buckland, 99-30285 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001).  Federal drug abuse control and prevention statutes 21 USC Secs. 841(b)(1(A) and (B), which once permitted a judge, rather than a jury, to increase the penalty above the statutory maximum based on the type and quantity of drugs involved in the offense, are now unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000);  dissenting, Judge Duplantier said that he agrees with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in USA v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078 (7th Cir. 2001).  B. Fletcher and Tashima (author), Circuit Judges, and Duplantier (dissenting), District Judge.  Z. Olbertz of Tacoma, WA, for the defendant-appellant;  AUSA A. Storm of Seattle, WA, for the plaintiff-appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

97)  SENTENCING / HEARSAY: USA v. Berry, 00-30222 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  A district court's failure to articulate express findings regarding the reliability of the hearsay statements of a co-defendant, introduced at the defendant's sentencing to show that the defendant was an organizer or a leader for purposes of USSG Sec. 3B1.1, does not require reversal when the reliability of the hearsay statements is apparent from the record.  Farris, Trott (author), and Berzon, Circuit Judges.  H. Brunner of Seattle, WA, for the plaintiff-appellee  T. Kosnoff of Bellevue, WA, for the defendant-appellant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

98)  SENTENCING: USA v. Basalo, 00-10457 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  Whether governmental misconduct at the plea bargaining stage prejudiced the defendant at sentencing is an objective question depending on the likely coercive effect of the misconduct on de-fendant's decision to proceed to trial rather than to continue plea talks;  the district court erroneously held that the ramifications of the deprivation of an important plea bargaining chip cannot be determined in an ex post hearing.  Schroeder, Wallace (author), and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  AUSA P. Robbins of San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiff;  G. Shifman of San Francisco, CA, for the defendant.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

99)  HABEAS CORPUS: Garvin v. Farmon, 00-15295 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  A state court determination that a defendant's confession was not tainted by an earlier police interrogation that violated the defendant's Miranda rights does not support habeas relief unless the state court ruling was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by Supreme Court rulings.  Kleinfeld (author), Hawkins, and Tallman, Circuit Judges.  B. Cohen of Berkeley, CA, for the appellant;  M. Kaye of San Francisco, CA, for the appellee.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

100)  HABEAS CORPUS: Bailey v. Newland, 99-17654 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2001).  The rule in USA v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), is clearly established Federal law for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and if police officers in the instant case commanded the defendant to open the door to his motel room, and he did not do so voluntarily, the officers needed either a warrant or probable cause.  Goodwin (author), Graber, and McKeown, Circuit Judges.  D. Porter of Sacramento, CA, for the appellant;  R. Marshall of Sacramento, CA, for the appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

101)  HABEAS CORPUS:  Wildman v. Johnson, 00-35355 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2001).  A defendant's acquittal on a felon-in-possession of a firearm charge after his counsel obtained the testimony of a ballistics expert did not compel the conclusion that the counsel was constitutio-
nally required to retain a similar expert when defendant the defendant against a "menacing" charge in another trial based on the same facts;  the defendant's acquittal on the "felon-in-
possession" charge may not have been the result of the ballis-tics expert's testimony, as the defendant maintains, but the result of some other reason, such as jury mistake or lenity, or the failure to believe the prosecution's evidence on a basis unrelated to the testimony of the ballistics expert.  McKeown, W. Fletcher (author), and Rawlinson, Circuit Judges. AFPD M. Weintraub of Eugene, OR, for the petitioner;  D. Casey of Salem, OR, for the respondent.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

102)  HABEAS CORPUS:  Fisher v. Roe, 00-55031 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).  Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state court's readback during the jury's deliberations of supposedly critical testimony, without the knowledge or participation of the defendants or their attorneys, violated the defendants' right to a fair and just hearing and thus to due process;  under "clearly established" Supreme court case law, the defendants had a right to be involved in and present at the readback if their absence could have undermined the fairness of the proceedings.  Trott (author), Thomas, and Berzon, Circuit Judges.  A. Denault of San Diego, CA, for the respondents-appellants;  M. Knox of Los Angeles, CA, for the petitioners-appellees.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

103)  HABEAS CORPUS:  Bunney v. Mitchell, 00-15432 (9th Cir. Filed March 5, 2001; withdrawn May 10, 2001; resubmitted Aug. 16, 2001).  For prisoners whose convictions became final before the enactment date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, April 24, 1996, the statutory time for filing a petition for federal habeas corpus is within one year after the AEDPA's effective date;  however, under 28 USC Sec. 2244(d)(2), the statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition is tolled until the denial of a prisoner's state-court habeas petitions is final.  Goodwin, Graber, and Paez, Circuit Judges.  Per Curiam.  M. Satris of Bolinas, CA, for the petitioner-appellant;  M. Kaye of San Francisco, CA, for the respondent-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

104)  HABEAS CORPUS:  Herbst v. Cook, 99-35133 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001).  A district court must give a federal habeas petitioner prior notice and an opportunity to respond before sua sponte dismissing his petition as time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effec-tive Death Penalty Act.  Alarcon, Fernandez, and Tashima (author), Circuit Judges.  M. Herbst pro se;  T. Sylwester of Salem, OR, for the respondent-appellee.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

105)  HABEAS CORPUS:  Frye v. Hickman, 99-15935 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  A habeas petitioner in a non-capital case, who did not have a statutory right to counsel, was not be entitled to the equitable tolling of the limitations period of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act due to his retained counsel's negligent failure to file a timely petition.  Schroeder (author), Lay, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.  M. Johns of Davis, CA, for the petitioner;  E. Christoffersen of Sacramento, CA, for the respondents. (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

106)  HABEAS CORPUS:  Dils v. Small, 99-55412 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  A pro se federal habeas corpus petition that is time-barred by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act does not relate back to a previous petition that is no longer pending;  Judge Pregerson concurred in the result.  Pregerson (concurring), Noonan (author), and Silverman, Circuit Judges.  DFPD L. Eskenazi of Los Angeles, CA, for the petitioner;  D. Druliner of Los Angeles, CA, for the respondents.   (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/

107)  PRISONERS' RIGHTS:  Mayweathers v. Newland, 00-16708 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001).  A prison policy of punishing Muslim inmates for missing work to attend a services called "Jumu'al" was not rationally related to a legitimate penological purpose.  Schroe-der, D.W. Nelson (author), and Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.  J. Bowers of Sacramento, CA, for the defendants;  S. Bryant of Davis, CA, for the plaintiffs.  (Download the full text of this decision at www.ce9.uscourts.gov/



MEMORANDA
Unpublished decisions may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except when
relevant under the Doctrine of Law of the Case, Res Judicata, or Collateral Estoppel.
Rule 36-3


 1)  CIVIL RICO:  Sanville v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, 00-56792 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2001) (unpublished).  Kozinski and Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Collins, District Judge.
       The District Court for the Southern District of California, Judge Lorenz presiding, dismissed Sanville's claims against the defendants.  The USCA affirmed.  It found it unnecessary to decide whether Sanville had standing to bring a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, as both his complaint and Civil Rico Case Statement failed to plead adequately the predicate acts of mail fraud (18 USC Sec. 1341), wire fraud (18 USC Sec. 1343), and money laundering (18 USC Sec. 1956).  Sanville did not meet the requirements of pleading fraud under FRCP 9(b) because he did not plead with sufficient particularity that the defendants had the "specific intent to deceive or defraud," as required for both mail and wire fraud.  Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1986).  The requirement of specific intent under these statutes is satisfied by the existence of a scheme reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension, and this intention is shown by examining the scheme itself.  Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1400.  Sanville's pleadings did not describe a scheme in which the defendants targeted their deceptions specifically and intentionally at the Infinity Group Company, the alleged victim of the purported RICO scheme.  Rather, at best the pleadings identified a scheme in which the defendants specifically intended to deceive state and federal reporting authorities.  Sanville's conclusory pleadings failed to plead a RICO theory with the requisite specificity.  Because Sanville failed to properly allege his substantive RICO violation, his RICO conspiracy claim also failed.  Sanville's state law negligence claim also failed as, under California law, banks owe no duty of care to fiduciary depositors.  Finally, Sanville's claim of common law fraud failed.  Because the pleadings failed to plead with particularity the specific intent element of the RICO predicate acts, they also failed to properly plead that the defendants intended to defraud.

2)  STANDING / TOBACCO CASES: Forces Action Project, LLC. v. California, 00-15280 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001) (unpublished).  Goodwin, Graber, and McKeown, Circuit Judges.
       The plaintiffs, a class of consumers of tobacco products alleged that the states of California and Utah, the City of San Francisco, and several tobacco companies (collectively "defendants") violated their rights to equal protection and due process when the defendants entered into the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).  The District Court for the Northern District of California, Judge Jenkins presiding, dismissed the action, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  The district court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. The USCA affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The plaintiffs argued that the MSA takes their property without due process as it requires the tobacco companies to "pass through" their monetary penalties in the form of higher prices for their consumer products.  However, the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this claim as they had not alleged an injury in fact.  The plaintiffs also argued that the MSA insulates the tobacco companies from claims that they otherwise could bring.  But the plaintiffs did not refer to any claims actually dismissed or to any claims that they planned to file.  The assertion of a mere hypothetical future injury was not sufficient to confer standing.  The plaintiffs next argued that California and Utah violated certain of their own statutes by not providing them with notice of their right to intervene in the underlying actions that were settled by the MSA.  Again, the plaintiffs had not established an injury in fact.  There was no evidence that either California or Utah instituted an action under any of the cited statutory provisions or that the MSA was a settlement of such statutory claims.  In fact, California's and Utah's complaints proved just the opposite.  The district court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add an antitrust claim on the ground that the proposed amendment was "clearly futile."  The court noted that, under the "direct purchaser" doctrine, indirect purchasers of products lack standing under the antitrust statutes.  The district court was correct to the extent that the plaintiffs sought antitrust damages from the tobacco companies.  However, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished between an antitrust claim that seeks damages and one that seeks injunctive relief, noting that the "direct purchaser" doctrine applies only to the former.  As the plaintiffs sought both damages and injunctive relief, the district court erred as a matter of law.  The defendants asserted that there were other reasons why plaintiffs should be denied leave to amend to add an antitrust claim seeking injunctive relief.  The USCA remanded this determination to the district court.

3)  ANTITRUST: California CNG, Inc. v. Southern California Gas Co., 00-55987 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001) (unpublished). Hug, Trott, and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.
        The District Court for the Central District of California, Judge Letts presiding, granted summary judgment to defendants Southern California Gas Company ("SoCalGas") and Henderson Engineering Company ("Henderson").
         The USCA affirmed.  The district court granted summary judgment to SoCalGas on the ground that plaintiffs California CNG, Inc., California CNG, and Prime of California, Inc. (collective, "CalCNG") failed to demonstrate that the alleged anticompetitive practices of SoCalGas were a material cause of CalCNG's economic misfortunes in the market for natural gas vehicles fueling stations.  Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that the harm they suffered was "by reason of" defendant's illegal activity.  15 USC Sec. 15(a).  According to the Supreme Court, "[plaintiff's] burden of proving the fact of damage under Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act is satisfied by its proof of some damages flowing from the unlawful conspiracy;  inquiry beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount and not the fact of damage.  It is enough that the illegality is shown to be a material  cause of the injury;  a plaintiff need not exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury in fulfilling his burden of proving compenable injury under Sec. 4." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 US 100 (1969).  In brief, the anticompeti-
tive activity of the defendant need not be the only cause of the plaintiff's injury, but it must be a material cause.  The fact that the cause must be material requires that the finding of harm be to some degree significant.  CalCNG has not met its burden of proof in this case.  Specifica-
lly, plaintiffs have not produced evidence that would support the inference that they could have made sales in the market but for the anti-competitive activity of SoCalGas.  Rather, the record demonstrates that CalCNG was at no point a viable competitor in the market.  Plaintiff failed to make a single sales during the relevant time period.  During this same time period, other partici-
pants in the market made sales.  More important, plaintiffs only made contact with a handful of potential purchasers and did now show that a single purchaser gave serious consideration to their offer.  Further, Prime was in desperate financial condition, and had a negative net worth by early 1993.  In spite of this fact, and in spite of the fact that their business plan stated that entering the market would require a substan-tial capital infusion, plaintiffs made minimal investments in their business.  Plaintiffs contend that they had substantial experience in the industry;  that they had exclusive rights to market the Pignone compressor; and that a report from Price Waterhouse projected success for their operations.  These things do not demons-
trate error by the district court.  First, although Prime had been in business for thirty years, that experience was in the liquid fuel business, and the two main persons involved in CalCNG were relatively new to the fuel business.  Second, the right to distribute the Pignone compre-
ssor does not establish that plaintiffs could have succeeded in the market.  Although it had a worldwide market share of 20%, the Pignone compressor never achieved more than a 2% market share in the United States.  Finally, in compiling its report, Price Waterhouse largely took figures provided by Pignone and CalCNG and plugged these figures into their calculations as assumptions.  The USCA agreed with the district court's statement that the report's "cru-cial underlying assumptions are speculative, unsubstantiated, and in many instances directly contrary to the uncontroverted facts in the record."  In sum, the USCA concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to SoCalGas on the ground that the plaintiffs had no hope of establishing that SoCalGas' practices, rather than the plaintiffs' own infirmities, were a material cause of their failure in the market.  Second, CalCNG argued that SoCalGas and Henderson conspired to terminate CalCNG's agreement with Henderson under which CalCNG served as the exclusive distributor of the Pignone compressor.  However, the USCA concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the inference of conspiracy was not reasonable in light of the business reasons for Henderson's termination of the distributorship agreement.

4)  TAXATION: Diesel Performance, Inc. v. CIR, 00-70351 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2001) (unpublished). Sneed, Wardlaw, and Berzon, Circuit Judges.
         Diesel Performance appealed a Tax Court's decision upholding the CIR's deficiency determination against it for the tax year ending June 30, 1994.  Diesel also appealed the denial of its motion for reconsideration.  The USCA affirmed.  First, the Tax Court correctly held that Diesel did not timely waive the carryback period for the tax year ending June 30, 1992.  The statute clearly required that the taxpayer "shall" elect to waive the carryback period "by the due date (including extensions of time) for filing the taxpayer's return for the taxable year of the net operating loss."  IRC Sec. 172(b)(3)(1986).  The regulations reiterated the deadline set by statute.  Second, the Tax Court correctly held the doctrine of equitable estoppel inapplicable because Diesel did not show that the CIR engaged in "affirmative misconduct," as required to invoke the doctrine against the government.  USA v. Hemmen, 51 F.3d 883, 892 (9th Cir. 1995).  Third, the Tax Court correctly held the doctrine of duty of consistency inapplicable because the CIR never took an inconsistent position with respect to his determination of the invalidity of Diesel's attempted waiver of the carryback period.  Fourth, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Diesel's motion to reconsider because there was no inconsistency between the CIR's determination that Diesel did not validly waive the carryback period (and thus cannot reduce its 1994 gross income) and his determination that Diesel did not timely file a refund claim for the tax year ending 1989 (and thus cannot receive a refund).  USA v. Dalm, 494 US 596, 605n.5 (1990) (A claim of equitable recoupment will lie only where the government has taxed a single transaction, item, or taxable event under two inconsistent theories.)

5)  BANKRUPTCY: In re Briles, 99-56967 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001) (unpublished).  Hug, Graber, and W. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.
        The USCA concluded that the Bankruptcy Court correctly held that Briles committed defalcation in a fiduciary capacity, rendering the judgment debt against her nondischargeable.  A debt is nondischargeable if it is "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity."  11 USC Sec. 523(a)(4).  Defalcation includes both the misappropriation of trust funds or money held in any fiduciary capacity and the failure to properly account for such funds.  Blyler v. Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001).  Under California law, Briles was acting in her capacity as a licensed real estate broker when she arranged a loan from Stevens to Aguilar.  Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 10131(d).  She thus acted in a fiduciary capacity under Sec. 523(a)(4).  Briles argued that even if she was acting in a fiduciary capacity, she did not commit defalcation as the arbitration decision did not establish that she was entrusted with property or funds.  The USCA disagreed.  The arbitration decision established that she caused the trust deed to be delivered to her unrecorded for the benefit of Stevens.  Moreover, Stevens relied on Briles to get the trust deed recorded without prejudiced to Stevens' security position.  The Aguilar purchase closed on March 23, 1990, but the trust deed was not recorded until April 24, 1990, by which time the Internal Revenue Service had recorded a lien with priority over Stevens'.  There was no evidence that Stevens ever held the trust deed.  According to the arbitrator, the circumstantial evidence was that the person who recorded the trust deed was either Briles or someone acting at her direction.  The arbitrator also found that Briles delayed the recording in part to conceal the loan's existence and thereby to protect her substantial commission on the Aguilar purchase.  By delaying the recording, Briles permitted the IRS to record a lien ahead of Stevens.  In so doing, she substantially reduced the value of property with which she had been entrusted and over which she had control.  The USCA held that this conduct constitutes defalcation either as a failure to account for property or as a misappro-priation of property.

6)  INSURANCE: Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 99-35935 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2001) (unpublished).  Alarcon, Fernandez, and Tashima, Circuit Judges.
        The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints appealed a summary judgment for Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company in an action over claims assigned to the Church by Brett Smith and his family after Smith negligently caused an accident while driving a Church-owned vehicle.
       The USCA affirmed.  The Church asserted that Smith was covered for this occurrence under his parents' Country Squire Pol-icy as the Church-owned vehicle was not available for Smith's regular use.  The Country Squire Policy excluded coverage for non-owned vehicles made available for the regular use of insured.  The Church assigned Smith a specific Church-owned vehicle to use to fulfill his missionary duties.  Those duties consumed most of Smith's time each day.  The Church also gave Smith blanket authority to use the vehicle for appropriate purposes.  On the evening of the accident, Smith was using his assigned vehicle for an authorized purpose and in an area in which the vehicle was expected to be used.  The Church-
owned vehicle thus was available for Smith's regular use and Smith was excluded from coverage under the Country Squire Policy.  The Church next asserted that Smith was covered for this occurrence under his parents' Umbrella Policy, an excess liability policy which covers only those automobile liability claims that are also covered by valid and collectible "underlying insurance."  The Church argued that its Kemper Policy qualified as underlying insurance, sufficient to trigger Smith's coverage under the Umbrella Policy.  However, the unambiguous terms of the Umbrella Policy es-tablished that the Country Squire Policy was the only underlying automobile insurance described in the declarations and, hence, the only policy that might trigger Smith's coverage under the Umbrella Policy.  Thus the Kemper Policy did not qualify as underlying insurance under the Umbrella Policy.  Because the Country Squire Policy did not cover Smith for his occurrence, the Umbrella Policy was unavailable as well.  The USCA concluded that the undisputed facts established that the Church-owned vehicle was available for Smith's regular use within the meaning of the Country Squire Policy and that Smith was not covered under the Umbrella Policy as the Kemper Policy did not qualify as underlying insurance. 

7)  INSURANCE: National Enterprise v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company, 00-56094 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2001) (unpublished).  Rymer and Rawlinson, Circuit Judges, and Pogue, District Judge.
        The District Court for the Southern District of California, Judge Whelan presiding, entered summary judgment for Stewart Title and denied a motion by National Enterprises Inc. ("NEI") to amend its complaint.  The USCA affirmed.  All but one of the claims raised in NEI's complaint were identical to counterclaims NEI filed in Stewart's 1995 declaratory judgment action.  The counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice by the district court as precluded by the lack of a valid coverage claim.  NEI appealed the district court's dismissal of the coverage claim, and the Ninth Circuit reversed that part of the district court's decision.  However, NEI did not appeal the dismissal of its counterclaims, and because of that waiver, the USCA affirmed the dismissal with prejudice.  Although the USCA said it noted in dicta that the counterclaim was premature, the basis for affirming the district court was waiver.  Thus, while NEI argued that there are no res judicata effects to dismissal of a claim brought prematurely, this was not the basis for the district court's dismissal.  The claims were not dismissed "for lack of jurisdiction," or lack of a precondition requisite.  By the plain operation of FRCP 41(c), the dismissal has res judicata effect and summary judgment was appropriate.

8)  SETTLEMENTS / DEFAULTS: Eleganze Auto Paint & Bodyworks, Inc. v. Maaco Enterprises, 00-55404 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2001) (unpublished).  Rymer and Rawlinson, Circuit Judges, and Restani, U.S. Court of Intl. Trade Judge.
       The District Court for the Central District of California, Judge Taylor presiding, granted a default judgment pursuant to FRCP 55(b) in favor of defendant Maaco Enterprises.  The default was entered on a claim to enforce a settlement agreement between Eleganze Auto Paint & Bodyworks and Maaco.  Eleganze appealed on the grounds that (1) no responsive pleading was required to Maaco's claim to enforce the settlement; and if it were required, Eleganze displayed excusable neglect; and (2) the judgment is void because an incompetent settlement agreement is unenforceable. 
       The USCA affirmed.  It found that the district court's decision to enter a default was not an abuse of discretion.  The record supports findings that (1) the district court had specifically instructed both parties to file pleadings before a status conference; (2) Maaco designated its pleading as a "Claim to Enforce Settlement Agreement" in compliance with the district judge's instruction; (3) Eleganze actually received Maaco's pleading before the conference;  (4) Eleganze failed to respond until a month after the conference;  (5) there was no excusable neglect, confusion or mistake given Eleganze's history; (6) there was no explanation for the delay; and (7) there was warning at the status conference about default.  Eleganze also argued that the judgment should be voided because the settle-ment agreement was incomplete, and therefore unenforceable.  The district court, however, did not evaluate the merits of the underlying claim for enforcement.  Rather, the agreement was ordered executed as a result of Eleganze's failure to make responsive pleadings for an evidentiary hearing to determine the very issue of enforceability of the agreement.  Thus, whether the district court had power to order the agreement executed is immaterial to the property of the entry of default.


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