1)  BANKRUPTCY: In re McKay, 99-55167 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2000) (unpublished).  B. Fletcher, Thomas, and Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.
        The District Court for the Southern District of California, Judge Whelan presiding, upheld the bankruptcy court's judgment that McKay's debt to Buchanan, established by a state court judgment, is nondischargeable under 11 USC Sec. 523(a)(4) (Supp. 2000). 
         The USCA affirmed.  First, because an adversary proceeding pursuant to Sec. 523 is a "core" bankruptcy proceeding, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude bankruptcy court jurisdiction.  The district court erred in holding otherwise.  Second, as a general proposition, federal courts must give full faith and credit to state court proceedings.  And, third, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to state court judgments in Sec. 523(a) discharge exception proceedings.  In determining the collateral estoppel effect of a state court judgment federal courts apply the collateral estoppel rules of the state in which they sit.  In California, collateral estoppel may be applied when: (1) the issue decided in the prior action is identical to the issue presented in the second action;  (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action;  (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the first action; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits; and (5) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.  Only the third and fourth elements were at issue on this appeal.  Contrary to McKay's assertion, the state court had decided that ETS was not a corporation.  Its entry of judgment recited that McKay was doing business as Electric Tech Service, Inc.  Under Pinkerton's Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), the designation of a "DBA" or "doing business as" merely indicates operation under a fictitious business name and the use of a fictitious business name does not create a separate legal entity.  The state court further unambiguously stated that McKay "breach[ed] his fiduciary duties in converting the funds under the circumstances of this case."  Because the proceedings involved only the pension plan funds, the state court necessarily decided the issue whether plan funds were converted.  Thus, the state court judgment is conclusive.  For these reasons, the salient question was necessarily decided in the state court proceeding and the third element of collateral estoppel is satisfied.  There was also a final judgment on the merits in state court, satisfying the fourth element of collateral estoppel.  Under California law, a judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.  Generally municipal courts need not issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law unless requested by the parties.  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Sec. 632.  In a non-jury trial, "judgment must be entered by the clerk, in conformity to the decision of the court, immediately upon the filing of such decision.  In no case is a judgment effectual for any purpose until entered.  The civil trial minutes present the court's specific "judgment" and not a tentative decision.  The singed judgment conformed to the civil trial minutes.  Thus, the civil trial minutes, in conjunction with the subsequent signed judgment, constitute a formal and final judgment under California procedural law.  The USCA rejected McKay's argument that the civil trial minutes were a "memorandum of intended decision" and thus cannot be given collateral estoppel effect.  The cases on which he relied involved decisions explicitly titled "Statement[s] of Intended Decision" and do not control the instant case.  McKay's argument that parties' failure to request, pursuant to Sec. 632, a copy of the court's "statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis," prevents finality of judgment also fails.  Section 632 creates a permissive procedure for parties to solidify a court's "tentative decision," not a prerequisite for finality.  Section 632 can be bypassed altogether by issuing a final decision in the first instance, as was done here.  Thus, because the state court decision was a final judgment, the bankruptcy court did not err in giving it collateral estoppel effect.

2)  BANKRUPTCY: In re Ybarra, 00-55039 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2000) (unpublished).  Farris, Reinhardt, and Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges.  Ybarra appealed an order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissing her appeal as untimely, and also appealed an order denying her motion for reconsideration.  The USCA affirmed.  Ybarra maintained that she did not file her notice of appeal within the 10-day time period because the clerk failed to serve her with the order.  However, failure of a clerk to mail a copy of the order and notice of entry "fails to provide a basis for treating an untimely notice of appeal as timely."  The BAP thus properly dismissed Ybarra's appeal and denied her motion for reconsideration. 

3)  TRADE DRESS: Oregon Arms, Inc. v. Oregon Arms Limited, 99-35768 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2000) (unpublished).  Hall, Rymer, and Graber, Circuit Judges.
       The District Court for Oregon, Judge Cooney presiding, granted partial summary judgment for the appellees (collectively "Rogue") on their trade dress infringement claims and issued a permanent injunction. 
        The USCA reversed and vacated the injunction.  Rogue claimed trade dress rights in the overall design of its .22 caliber, bolt-action, youth rifle, the Chipmunk.  To establish a claim under Sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act for infringement of trade dress rights in a product's configuration, Rogue must establish three basic elements:  (1) non-functionality, (2) secondary meaning, and (3) likelihood of confusion.  Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Industries, 199 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1999), explained that "where the whole is nothing other than the assemblage of functional parts, and where even the arrangement and combination of the parts is designed to result in superior performance, it is semantic trickery to say that there is till some sort of 'overall appearance' which is non-functional."  The appellants (collectively "Keystone") presented evidence that the Chipmunk's individual components offer utilitarian advantages and are thus functional.  The record also contains evidence that the Chipmunk's overall arrangement of components is the results of a "matter of engineering design."  For example, the Chipmunk's designer, James Thompson, testified that the size, weight, and balance of the Chipmunk contribute to its safety for children.  He testified that changing the Chipmunk's overall design might make it less safe, that making the rifle heavier would make it less safe, and that changing its length would affect its balance, which could make it less safe.  Rogue argued that the court should not isolate the safety benefits of any particular feature of the rifle, but nonetheless acknowledges that the safety benefits of a component depend on its relationship to the design as a whole, further suggesting that the overall design is functional.  The record also contains evidence that the Chipmunk's overall design provides other utilitarian advantages such as light weight, small size, and ease of handling.  The USCA concluded that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the Chipmunk's overall design is non-functional.  Although the evidence that approximately twenty other rifles compete in the youth rifle market is relevant in determining whether the Chipmunk's design is non-functional, it does not complete the analysis.  There is no evidence that the other rifle designs provide the same utilitarian features and benefits as the Chipmunk's design.  Moreover, the bare fact that Keystone copied the Chipmunk does not "lessen the necessity for [Rogue] to prove its configuration non-functional."  It is permissible to copy a product design that is functional.  In finding no genuine issue of fact as to whether the Chipmunk's design has developed secondary meaning, the district court erred in giving dispositive weight to the fact that Keystone "reverse engineered," or copied, the Chipmunk's design.  Although evidence of deliberate copying can support a determination of secondary meaning, it does not in itself shift the burden of proving secondary meaning from Rogue to Keystone.  In addition, Keystone presented evidence that it took some steps to distinguish its rifle from Rogue's rifle.  All the Davey Crickett rifles have Keystone's cricket logo and the receiver and the Crickett name on the butt plate.  After the first 300 Davey Cricket rifles, which carried the manufacturer name of "Oregon Arms, Ltd.," Keystone also made some changes in the Davey Crickett design after the first 300 rifles were produced.  Keystone has thus presented evidence to counter an inference of secondary meaning arising from the fact that it copied the Chipmunk design.  Rogue argues that the length and exclusivity of its use of the Chipmunk's design establishes that the design has developed second meaning.  Although length and exclusivity of use are relevant to a finding of secondary meaning, they are not dispositive.  Furthermore, Keystone has presented evidence suggesting that Chipmunk itself is imply a scaled down copy of another rife, thus indicating that the design may not have secondary meaning.  The USCA concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of the Chipmunk's design is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.  Keystone also claimed that the district court erred in finding no genuine issue of fact as to a likelihood of confusion.  The USCA agreed.  Under Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E.&J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1998), the likelihood of confusion exists when "customers viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark."  Rogue's evidence of actual confusion consists largely of evidence that customers were confused as to whether Rogue/Oregon Arms, Inc., was still in business.  The list of confused persons that Rogue provided in its answers to interrogatories is described as a list of persons who "have called plaintiff's business and complained that they were misled or confused about whether plaintiff was still in business, whether defendants were affiliated with plaintiffs in any way, and whether the Crickett and Chipmunk rifles are made by the same manufacturer."  There is no indication which, if any, of the person on the list were confused as to the source, rather than being confused as to whether Oregon Arms, Inc. was still in business.  And there is no indication that the persons on the list became confused because of the similarity of the designs of the two rifles.  Only one person, Terrance Croft, stated that he became confused as to the source of his Chipmunk after seeing a Davey Crickett.  Furthermore, Rogue provided no consumer surveys demonstrating confusion.  It was undisputed that Keystone copied the Chipmunk's design and that the Chipmunk and the Davey Cricket are similar in appearance.  Yet Keystone made some changes to the Davey Crickett design.  Keystone also lab